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Gavin Miller
The APATheTic FALLAcy
in A Study of HiStory, Arnold Toynbee advises his audience to beware what he calls the “apathetic fallacy.” Whereas “Ruskin warned his read-
ers against the “‘pathetic fallacy’ of imaginatively endowing inanimate 
objects with life,” the historian needs to avoid “the converse error of 
applying to historical thought, which is a study of living creatures, a 
scientific method devised for the study of inanimate nature.”1 Toynbee’s 
term was later adapted to psychology by R. D. Laing in his discussion of 
the tension between neuroscientific and interpersonal attitudes towards 
the infant:
if one does not feel that a baby feels, it is an almost irresistible conclu-
sion that it must be an illusion to feel that it does. if one does feel for a 
baby’s feelings, one will find it difficult not to conclude that those who 
do not are suffering from a loss of sensibility more radical than the loss 
of one of the senses.
have we here a pathetic fallacy or an apathetic fallacy?2 
Laing, of course, firmly believed that the scientifically objectifying 
account of the infant involved a pseudoscientific pretense that the infant’s 
subjective experience was either unreal or, at the very least, irrelevant.
The apathetic fallacy may be diagnosed in fields other than history 
and psychology. Although John Searle does not use the term, he also, 
in essence, discovers an apathetic fallacy in the assumptions of modern 
philosophy: “We have the conviction that if something is real, it must 
be equally accessible to all competent observers. Since the seventeenth 
century, educated people in the West have come to accept an absolutely 
basic metaphysical presupposition: Reality is objective. This assumption has 
proved useful to us in many ways, but it is obviously false, as a moment’s 
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reflection on one’s own subjective states reveals.”3 Searle calls for a 
philosophical rediscovery of mind, and warns us not to confuse “the 
epistemological sense of the subjective/objective distinction” with the 
“ontological sense”: “There is a persistent confusion between the claim 
that we should try as much as possible to eliminate personal subjective 
prejudices from the search for truth and the claim that the real world 
contains no elements that are irreducibly subjective” (RM, p. 19). 
i shall argue that the apathetic fallacy attributed by Toynbee, Laing 
and Searle to their respective disciplines is also apparent in literary 
criticism. The repudiation and neglect of subjective phenomena are 
applauded as necessary to literary inquiry; our investigations are sup-
posedly epistemologically objective (rational, disinterested) only if 
they are about what is ontologically objective (equally accessible to all, 
not part of the “inner world” of subjectivity). This mistaken fusion of 
epistemological and ontological objectivity lurks in the founding texts 
of modern literary inquiry: the intentional fallacy, for instance, is puta-
tively an error precisely because it introduces into critical inquiry an 
ontologically subjective phenomenon—namely, intended meaning. The 
disciplinary injunction to repudiate mental phenomena also functions as 
a gatekeeper that determines which parts of other disciplines can most 
easily migrate to literary inquiry. Lacanian theory moves so successfully 
from psychoanalysis to literary criticism precisely because it attempts to 
eliminate mentalist concepts from the psychoanalytic and psychiatric 
universe of discourse. Because of its commitment to an unrecognized 
apathetic fallacy, literary criticism continues to produce such egregious 
misreadings as Fredric Jameson’s Lacan-inspired account of the “new 
sentence” in U.S. poetry. The most celebrated contemporary Marxist 
critic entirely misses the Marxist aesthetic of the new sentence because 
he is blinded by his Lacanian analogy, and by the general assumptions 
of literary-critical inquiry, to the meanings intended by those who write 
as part of this poetic movement.
I
in their arguments “against theory,” Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels contend that literary theory has typically and erroneously 
imagined that there may be two kinds of linguistic meaning.4 One 
kind of meaning is constituted by the interplay of sign sequence and 
linguistic convention (i shall refer to this as “verbal meaning”).5 The 
other kind of meaning is constituted by what a speaker intends to say in 
50 Philosophy and Literature
some particular use of a sign sequence (i shall refer to this as “intended 
meaning”). Literary theory then becomes entangled in competing 
claims for the superiority (and often the reality or unreality) of either 
of the two supposed kinds of meaning. Anti-intentionalist criticism, 
for instance, regards as sufficient a knowledge of the verbal meaning, 
howsoever indefinite or polysemous it may be. A certain kind of “moder-
ate” intentionalist literary criticism, on the other hand, specifies verbal 
meaning by reference to a determining intention that constrains its 
indefinite possibilities.
Knapp and Michaels argue, however, that there is only intended mean-
ing. They provide a reductio ad absurdum to make their point (“AT,” pp. 
727–30). if there is indeed a kind of meaning that is constituted purely 
by the interplay of signs and rules, then such meaning exists in a rela-
tion of causal (rather than ontological) dependence upon a speaker’s 
intention. A meaningful sign sequence of this kind could therefore 
be produced by some non-intentional causality. if, for instance, marks 
resembling the words of a poem were produced by the action of the 
waves on a beach, then these words would have to be classed as mean-
ingful even though they were produced without any agency. But this 
is absurd, argue Knapp and Michaels: the marks are not meaningful, 
they merely resemble meaningful signs. The only kind of meaning that 
exists is a speaker’s intended meaning. indeed, it is only the essential 
intentionality of meaning that allows us to even conceive (mistakenly) 
of a separate verbal meaning—for it is the speaker’s intention to say 
something in a certain language that specifies the conventions relevant 
to the words that he or she produces.
One response to Knapp and Michaels is particularly relevant to my 
discussion of the apathetic fallacy in literary criticism. it may be argued 
that meaning cannot be identified with an “inner” semantic intention 
precisely because it seems absurd that a speaker could ex hypothesi intend 
a meaning which could not be construed from his words. Knapp and 
Michaels attack precisely this counter-argument: “your meaning,” they 
respond, “doesn’t become a different meaning when you fail to express 
the meaning you intended” (“AT2,” p. 67). They argue that even if the 
speaker’s words fail under normal conventions to convey his intended 
meaning, the meaning remains his semantic intention, no matter what 
beliefs an interpreter might arrive at by considering the speaker’s 
actual words. To support this view, they give the example of a situation 
in which a car passenger successfully communicates his desire that the 
driver should stop the vehicle immediately, even though this intended 
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meaning is communicated with sounds that either contradict linguistic 
conventions, or escape them entirely (“AT2,” pp. 65–66). Knapp and 
Michaels are not alone in arguing that linguistic convention is essentially 
an aid to the discovery of meaning, rather than essential to meaning 
itself. Their position is taken also by P. D. Juhl, who points out that “we 
do not ordinarily take a man to have said, or his utterance to mean, what 
we know or believe he did not mean (on the basis of our knowledge 
about the speaker, his facial expressions, gestures, what else he says, and 
so on), even if the rules of the language do not allow the sentence he 
uttered to mean what he intended to convey.”6 
Just why does the subjectivity, the “inwardness,” of intended meaning 
appear to be a “knock-down” argument against intentionalism? One 
important consideration is surely what seem to be the intolerable episte-
mological consequences of allowing the meaning of an expression to be 
what the agent intended by it, even where this semantic intention breaks 
the rules of the speaker’s language. if a seemingly secure conventional 
interpretation may fail to apprehend the speaker’s semantic intention, 
then it would seem that any interpretation is ultimately hostage to a 
speaker’s avowal of such a failure. The speaker would appear to have an 
absolute authority over his interpreters, who may, at any instant, find that 
their understanding was mistaken—that the speaker has by an arbitrary 
and capricious declaration entirely invalidated their understanding.
This concern about the speaker’s (or the author’s) capacity in strong 
intentionalist theories to pull the rug from under the interpreter’s feet 
is reinforced when the entire discipline of literary criticism seems held 
hostage. in “The intentional Fallacy,” it is the supposed epistemologi-
cal difficulties of intentionalism to which W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe 
Beardsley ultimately object. evidence that is irrelevant to the reading 
of a poem consists of “what . . . is private or idiosyncratic; not a part 
of the work as a linguistic fact: it consists of revelations (in journals, 
for example, or letters or reported conversations).”7 The rhetoric of 
intention as revelation re-appears when they consider the hypothesis 
that one might simply write to T. S. eliot and ask him what he wanted 
to say in his poetry: “such an answer to such an inquiry . . . would not 
be a critical inquiry. . . . critical inquiries are not settled by consulting 
the oracle” (“iF,” p. 18). To allow questions about the author’s mental 
life into critical inquiry would be to subject a community of rational 
inquirers to the supposed incorrigible authority of the author’s claims 
about his intention.
To prevent the subjection of hermeneusis to such autocratic or 
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 theocratic authority (a subjection which would be seemingly the destruc-
tion of critical inquiry), Wimsatt and Beardsley develop a particular 
ontology of meaning in order to protect the epistemological objectiv-
ity of literary criticism. They hypothesize that meaning arises purely 
in the public interplay of sign and linguistic convention, without any 
constitution from the ontologically subjective realm of intention. Their 
anti-intentionalism is thus a democratic revolution of the poem against 
its authorial master, a revolution demanded by the methodological rigor 
necessary to constitute a disciplinary investigation.
Such is the seeming force of the argument against the author as 
“oracle,” that even the apparently intentionalist theory of e. D. hirsch 
accepts an anti-intentionalist ontology of meaning. As Juhl explains, 
hirsch in fact “begins with the assumption that any literary text can be 
properly construed in a number of different ways, limited only by the 
principle of sharability” (I, p. 18). But if “literary interpretation is to be 
a science or discipline” (I, p. 18), then—according to hirsch, at least—
“we need a criterion which allows, at least in principle, one and only 
one interpretation . . . to qualify as correct or valid” (I, p. 19). hirsch 
therefore characterizes the investigation of the author’s semantic inten-
tion not as an investigation of meaning proper, but rather as a norm 
by which one constrains the essential polysemy of meaning so that the 
practice of literary criticism may begin.
Nonetheless, the “intention as revelation” argument, which seems to 
justify the hypothesis of a distinct verbal meaning, relies on our habits 
of thought rather than genuine epistemological problems with reports 
of intention. Wimsatt and Beardsley’s argument appeals to a suspicion 
of so-called “first-person warranted claims” that was originally developed 
by behaviorism in opposition to introspective methods in psychology. As 
charles P. Siewert explains, the behaviorist argument was, in essence, 
that because “introspection” can be performed “only on oneself, we are 
dealing here with a sort of observation that cannot be confirmed by 
others, as they cannot introspect one’s states of mind.”8 Since “confirm-
ability of claims by multiple investigators is . . . what distinguishes science 
from activities that rely crucially on the supposed special authority of 
particular individuals” (SC, p. 62), then there can be no methodological 
place for first-person warranted claims. however, in the case of first-
person warranted claims of authorial intention, at any rate, such “special 
authority” is not to be found. These claims do not have the oracular 
character that Wimsatt and Beardsley suppose, for they are vulnerable 
to publically observable evidence that may impugn the author’s sincerity 
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and authenticity. When an authorial claim about semantic intention is 
made that contradicts what seems to be the best interpretation of the 
author’s words, it is not unproblematically authoritative. The author may 
be consciously trying to deceive us about her intentions (Noël carroll 
gives a real example of a prima facie insincere claim).9 even when the 
claim of a different semantic intention seems sincere, the author may 
have misremembered, or be making some other self-deceiving error, 
yet without any consciously mendacious intent. Only if the author’s 
claim about his intention is regarded as incorrigible, as possessing the 
traditional “mark of the mental,”10 would the interpretation be imme-
diately disconfirmed, and critical inquiry seemingly led towards “dark 
and elusive creatures of the mentalist night”11 that only the author can 
reliably introspect. 
My aim in reconstructing and extending the debate opened up by 
Knapp and Michaels is not so much to contribute directly to it (there 
is already a very thorough literature, and i find Knapp and Michaels’ 
arguments to be convincing), but rather to articulate a particular assump-
tion about what is needed to make literary criticism properly cogni-
tive. As the author-as-oracle argument demonstrates, literary criticism 
typically requires an attitude of habitual anti-mentalism: to secure the 
epistemological objectivity of literary criticism, a wholly public ontology 
is demanded for its objects. Without such an ontology, critical inquiry 
putatively reverts to the supposed pre-scientific condition of psychology 
before behaviorism, when introspective methods allegedly demanded an 
oracular and incorrigible “self-observation.” As i have argued, the erro-
neous fusion of epistemological and ontological objectivity is apparent 
in the anti-intentionalist theories of meaning criticized by Knapp and 
Michaels. Such theories exemplify the “apathetic fallacy” by which the 
subjective phenomena studied by a discipline are repudiated because 
they seem impossible to investigate. As behaviorism tried to do without 
conscious experience, so literary criticism aims—as it strives towards 
theoretical rigor—to do without the shadowy realm of the mental.
II
Anti-mentalism is central to literary criticism’s claim to a proper object 
and a methodical cognition of that object. it is also an element in the 
prestige of theories that literary criticism imports from other disciplines. 
This can be seen in literary theory’s preference for a psychoanalytic 
paradigm that dispenses with the psyche: Lacanian theory, which 
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 dominates psychoanalytic literary criticism, is—as much as the argument 
of “The intentional Fallacy”—constructed upon a repudiation of the 
mental. While certain schools of psychoanalysis might refer to “mental 
processes, quite outside the personal consciousness,” such a mentalist 
account of the unconscious would be rejected by Lacanian theory.12 This 
rejection occurs not so much because of the (debatable) incoherence 
of the concept of unconscious mental activity, but because of a more 
fundamental Lacanian aversion to the study of mental phenomena, 
whether in neurotic, psychotic, or even “normal” psychology.
When Lacan declares, “the great secret of psychoanalysis is that there 
is no psychogenesis,”13 he explicitly opposes the thesis that we under-
stand even the everyday, seemingly non-psychopathological actions of 
others by virtue of the empathic intersubjectivity posited by Karl Jaspers 
in General Psychopathology.14 Lacan uses against Jaspers arguments devel-
oped by positivism, and particularly by behaviorism.15 Understanding, 
Lacan contends, claims imaginative insight into other minds, but merely 
applies a pre-theoretical folk-psychology which “consists in thinking 
that some things are self-evident” (P, p. 6). Furthermore, the supposed 
Jaspers-style understanding of an action—e.g., that someone is crying 
because they have been slapped—fails to provide a causally sufficient 
explanation: “When one gets a smack there are many other ways of 
responding than by crying. One can return it in kind, or else turn the 
other cheek, or one can also say—Hit me, but listen! ” (P, p. 6). Nor is 
there any statistical correlation provided by understanding which might 
substitute for a causally sufficient explanation: the suicide curve, for 
instance, shows that more suicides occur in spring, rather than in the 
dark days of autumn and winter, seasons which might seem more likely 
to motivate self-destruction (P, p. 7). 
Lacan’s arguments share the same failings as those advanced by the 
positivists, since they assume what is in question—namely that a psycho-
genetic explanation could only be valid if it provided the kind of account 
given in the natural sciences (particularly in physics). indeed, even as 
Lacan criticizes Jaspers for failing to live up to the nomothetic model 
of explanation, he offers his own distinct model for the understanding 
of actions. Lacan’s rather obliquely presented positive account places 
“psychogenesis” in the realm of observable quasi-linguistic behavior: “i 
remember a small boy who whenever he got a smack used to ask—Was 
that a pat or a slap? if he was told it was a slap he cried, that belonged to 
the conventions, to the rules of the moment, and if it was a pat he was 
delighted” (P, p. 6). Lacan offers his own way of removing the psyche 
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from “psychogenesis,” and he does so, in a somewhat ad hoc way, with 
structuralist concepts. The child in Lacan’s example must discriminate 
between a pat and a slap by drawing the correct—presumably conven-
tional, rather than intended—contrastive boundary in a continuous 
phenomenon, viz. the strength of the smack. correctly identifying this 
item then allows a response that is explicitly a matter of adherence to 
public conventions, rather than the expression of psychic life. 
Whatever the merits of Lacan’s account, it indicates that Lacanian 
theory strives towards an objective ontology. This is even more appar-
ent when one considers the Lacanian transposition of the unconscious 
mind to a public and ultimately linguistic realm. Bruce Fink explains 
that, for Lacanians, “Truth is not so much ‘found’ or ‘uncovered’ by 
[psychoanalytic] interpretation, as created by it.”16 in interpreting “what 
patients actually say over what they mean” (LP, p. 25), the Lacanian 
analyst does not claim to interpret communications from the uncon-
scious mind. Rather, the “unconscious” is produced by interpretations 
of the analysand’s speech that challenge the analysand’s self image 
(so contradicting his intended meaning), but which are nonetheless 
compatible with his verbal productions (thereby drawing upon the 
indefinite possibilities of verbal meaning). For instance, in dealing with 
a homosexual patient who thinks of himself as loving his supportive 
heterosexual father (a father who is “one hundred percent behind me”), 
the analyst would regard the apparently elliptical statement “‘My father 
was a hundred percent behind’” as “a bona fide Freudian slip, allowing 
of the following translations: ‘My father was a complete ass,’ ‘My father 
was only interested in ass,’ ‘My father was only interested in anal sex,’ 
and so on” (LP, p. 23).
The ethics of the Lacanian “unconscious” are, i believe, less than 
benign. The interpretative practice that Fink describes seems indistin-
guishable from the hermeneutics of abuse directed at Barack Obama 
for his 2008 campaign comment that “you can put lipstick on a pig; 
it’s still a pig.”17 This remark was meant as a metaphor for Republican 
policy, but was interpreted by the Republicans as a reference to Sarah 
Palin’s candidature for Vice-President. The “pig” in the metaphor, they 
insisted, was Palin, who had earlier joked—with implicit reference to 
herself—that the difference between “a hockey mom and a pit bull [ter-
rier]” was “lipstick.”18 had only the Republicans been more Lacanian, 
they could have added that Obama’s repudiation of this interpretation 
indicated his pre-analytic investment in a specular image of wholeness 
and self-identity. 
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Fink condones the reconceptualization of the psychoanalytic uncon-
scious as a publically observable verbal interaction in which—one might 
say—the therapist enforces a possible verbal meaning that challenges 
the analysand’s preferred interpretation of his own words. (The phrase 
“analysand’s preferred interpretation of his own words” here seems 
the best equivalent for what might otherwise be called the analysand’s 
“intended meaning.”) But for François Roustang, Lacan’s attempt to 
mould psychoanalysis to “the ultimate requirements of scientific knowl-
edge” merely repudiates the unconscious mind, the specific mental 
object of psychoanalysis.19 Lacan’s mistake, thinks Roustang, is to cast 
the instrument of psychoanalytic knowledge as its object: “Since we 
know the unconscious—source of the dream, the slip and the joke—
only through language, the unconscious is structured like a language. 
Which is tantamount to saying: Since we can only know certain objects 
by looking at them, these objects are structured like eyes” (LD, pp. 
111–12). Lacanians have endured withering scrutiny of the psychological 
claims seemingly made by their theory, especially Lacan’s celebrated, or 
notorious, account of the “mirror stage.”20 yet as both Fink and Roustang 
explain (albeit with contrary aims), the Lacanian project is informed by 
the same anti-mentalism as the once scientifically dominant program of 
behaviorist psychology. The latter tried to develop a general psychology 
with reference only to observable phenomena in relations of efficient 
causality.21 Lacanians, on the other hand, try to reconceptualize psy-
choanalysis using linguistic concepts that eliminate any reference to a 
realm of unconscious mentation.
Lacanian theory’s repudiation of the mental extends from the nor-
mal and the neurotic “mind” (really, normal and psychoanalytic verbal 
interactions) to its account of psychosis. Language is again the essential 
object of inquiry: psychotic speech is regarded as lacking the recipro-
cal determination of part and whole demanded by hermeneusis. Fink 
explains that in normal speech, “certain elements prepare the way for 
others, and none of the elements is completely independent: they are 
all ‘chained together’ (this is why Lacan uses the expression ‘signifying 
chain’)” (LP, p. 95). yet, in psychosis, there is “a disturbance in the usual 
process of meaning making, and [it] is related to the sense in which 
words are things for the psychotic” (LP, p. 95). Without the part-whole 
structure of the “signifying chain,” words become isolated signifiers, 
incapable of conveying any signified: a psychotic patient’s speech may 
furnish various neologisms loaded with “a significance that he or she 
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often describes as ineffable or incommunicable,” but that these terms 
“cannot be explained or defined” by the psychotic indicates the rupture 
of the signifying chain in psychotic speech (LP, p. 95). 
This Lacanian account of psychosis clearly recasts Jaspers’ quite tra-
ditional account of psychotic speech and action as “ununderstandable.” 
There is, though, at least one vital difference. Although Jaspers states 
that schizophrenic patients might “rave wildly, make meaningless ges-
tures and carry out senseless acts,” he regards this nonsensical behavior, 
verbal and non-verbal, as an expression of “schizophrenic psychic life” 
(GP, p. 581). Neologisms, for instance, indicate that the schizophrenic 
really is having a unique experience: “schizophrenic patients find new 
words for their utterly indescribable body sensations—e.g. ‘es zirrt’ and 
so on” (GP, p. 581). Lacanian theory, however, adapts Jaspers’ account 
to an anti-mentalist program. That psychotic speech is ununderstand-
able can properly indicate only a malfunction in language, rather than 
warrant any inferences about the peculiarity of psychotic experience. 
Psychosis is therefore objectively reduced to a recurring aposiopesis 
which persistently severs the so-called “signifying chain.” Jaspers leaves 
at least the empirical possibility that a sufficiently plastic interpreter 
might understand a psychotic’s speech and action (and Laing believed 
that such understanding was indeed possible).22 But for Lacanian theory, 
this is simply impossible, since there is nothing to understand in the 
psychotic’s words. Psychotic speech does not express, even in some 
recondite way, the nature of a psychotic’s “inner experience.”
III
The repudiation of the mental in Lacan’s pseudo-structuralist account 
of normal, neurotic, and psychotic life is surely part of its claim to a 
properly scientific and rigorous development of Freudian ideas: structur-
alist anti-intentionalism and conventionalism provide, as Thomas Pavel 
argues, a promise of disciplinary modernization infused with “echoes 
of behaviourism and the project of the unity of science.”23 Lacan’s 
structuralist (ontological) objectivity in the name of (epistemological) 
objectivity appeals also to literary theorists, who have been schooled, 
since the intentional fallacy at the very least, in the irrelevance of mental 
phenomena to their critical inquiries. The anti-mentalism of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and post-war literary criticism fatally combine in Fredric 
Jameson’s influential, Lacan-inspired account of postmodern art as 
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“schizophrenic.” in Jameson’s analysis, the repudiation of consciousness 
is so extreme that he is unable to understand the Marxist meanings 
intended by some of the literary artists whose work he considers.
Jameson insists that, in making an analogy between contemporary art 
and psychosis, he need not ask whether Lacanian theory has “clinical 
accuracy”: he is neither diagnosing postmodern artists as psychotic, nor 
proposing that Lacanian schizophrenia is the psychopathology typical 
of late-capitalist society.24 i am not wholly convinced by this claim, for if 
postmodern “schizophrenia” and its accompanying challenge to histori-
cal narrative were only an issue for avant-garde art, then it would scarcely 
seem such a worry. Moreover, there is a difficulty that persists even if 
Jameson does in fact use Lacanian schizophrenia to offer no more than 
a “suggestive aesthetic model” (P, p. 26): the resulting aesthetic model, 
in its fusion of epistemological and ontological objectivity, absurdly 
repudiates and disregards authorial intention.
Admittedly, Jameson is not always consistent in the apathetic fallacy 
that he inherits from his clinical source. he to some extent presents 
schizophrenic speech as expressive of schizophrenic experience, rather 
than as a linguistic malfunction. he suggests, for instance, that the 
schizophrenic’s temporal horizon has shrunk to a continual present: the 
schizophrenic personality cannot “extend pro-tensions and re-tensions 
across the temporal manifold” (P, p. 25). But, against what seems to be a 
statement about time-consciousness, he also claims that “active temporal 
unification is itself a function of language, or better still of the sentence, 
as it moves along its hermeneutic circle through time” (P, p. 27). With 
this somewhat murky reduction of temporal continuity to a linguistic 
phenomenon, it is the ontologically objective interpretation of Lacan 
that wins out: “With the breakdown of the signifying chain, […] the 
schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers, 
or, in other words, a series of pure and unrelated presents in time” (P, 
p. 27). in Jameson’s account of Lacan (and in a manner faithful to 
the Lacanian program), temporal continuity is essentially a publically 
observable, and in that sense “objective,” linguistic phenomenon.
i have argued that Lacan’s ontologically objective reconceptualiza-
tion of psychosis eliminates from Lacanian clinical practice even the 
barest possibility that one could understand a schizophrenic: all that 
a schizophrenic can do is endless perform his failed linguistic compe-
tence, rather than properly communicate anything about his experi-
ence. This same repudiation of the mental carries over into Jameson’s 
aesthetics, where it is reinforced by the widespread anti-intentionalism 
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of literary inquiry. Jameson consequently precludes any possibility that 
the superficially “schizophrenic” artwork could do anything other than 
exemplify the failure of historical narrative under late capitalism. As a 
result, the U.S.’s most illustrious Marxist critic entirely misconstrues 
the homegrown Marxist poetic of the so-called “new sentence” in his 
reading of Bob Perelman’s poem “china.”
A small but significant body of literature has developed which politely, 
yet insistently points out the errors in Jameson’s account of “china.”25 
This poem, and others like it, Perelman himself explains, is “self-critical, 
ambitiously contextualized, and narrative in a number of ways. Far 
from being fragments, these sentences derive from a coherent, wide-
ranging political analysis” (“PN,” p. 316). The central issue in this criti-
cal response to Jameson is the disjointedness of poems written with the 
“new sentence.” Although Jameson’s reading casts this disjunctiveness 
as essentially aposiopesis (he talks of its “schizophrenic fragmentation,” 
P, p. 28), Perelman identifies the same textual feature as parataxis. We 
have in the new sentence, according to the author of “china,” not a 
series of interrupted thoughts, but rather a coherent analysis in which 
connections are hinted at, rather than hypotactically developed. Perel-
man takes as an example poetry in the new sentence by Ron Silliman; 
he discovers a Marxist master-narrative linking “the domesticity of the 
kitchen with the spectacle of identical bungalows with the minute units 
of the pennies in the fountain with the small verbal differences between 
sentences that Quine ignores; the renters with the homeowners with the 
homeless person; housing policies with positivism with writing practices” 
(“PN,” p. 316). Perelman’s implicit admonition to Jameson—“any spe-
cific work written using the new sentence cannot be read in a focused 
way without attention to the original context” (“PN,” p. 321)—is thus 
a reminder that the new sentence was intended as a poetic expression 
of a particular response to post-war U.S. capitalism. To understand the 
new sentence, it is helpful to know something about the experiences 
and beliefs of the people that write with it.
Jameson’s error is to construe the “new sentence” as a failure to 
provide meaningful linguistic expression, rather than as the meaning-
ful use of a particular rhetorical strategy: in Perelman’s words, “Where 
Jameson sees signifying chains snapping, Silliman sees the cobwebs of 
the reified narratives of false consciousness being swept away” (“PN,” p. 
317). indeed, that Jameson should even attempt a reading of the new 
sentence as aesthetically schizophrenic is particularly surprising since, 
as Juhl argues, we do not normally dismiss the linguistic deviations of 
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literary texts as a failure in meaning: “literary and especially poetic texts 
frequently violate the syntactic and semantic rules of the language in 
which they are written. if we construed those works in terms of the 
standard linguistic rules, . . . many of them would make little sense 
and some none at all” (I, p. 108). Although it might be argued that 
the new sentence is not properly a syntactic or semantic phenomenon, 
there is still no reason why textual disjointedness should immediately 
be identified with a lack of meaning. Noël carroll’s example from film 
provides an analogy: “in Man with a Movie Camera, when the filmmaker 
Dziga Vertov intercuts shots of the activities of a Soviet cameraman with 
shots of the activities of all sorts of other Soviet workers, we interpret 
these juxtapositions as promoting the assertion that the Soviet cam-
eraman is a worker, just like any other. however, this interpretation 
cannot rely upon the conventional meaning of juxtaposition in the 
cinema. Juxtaposition has no conventional meaning in film. instead, in 
order to understand the shot chain, we ask ourselves what point Vertov 
intends to impart by means of these juxtapositions” (BA, pp. 192–93). 
The poetry of the “new sentence” is in a similar position: there is an 
intended meaning which can be gleaned from its abrupt transitions 
and juxtapositions—an intention which we can infer given the subject 
matter of the poetry, and what we know about its authors, their beliefs, 
and the wider cultural context. 
however, in Jameson’s reading, Perelman and his fellow authors end 
up in a position parallel to that of the Lacanian psychotic. Their writing 
is taken as a specimen of postmodern aesthetic schizophrenia, rather 
than an as intentional expression that can be understood by conven-
tional hermeneusis (with additional evidence for the interpretation 
coming, perhaps, from extra-poetic sources). The consequence of the 
apathetic fallacy within Jameson’s theory of the postmodern is thus to 
eliminate, by an academic fiat, the capacity for certain contemporary 
literary works to initiate and hold a conversation about the nature of 
the present. A contemporary text with prima facie disjunctive, paratactic, 
or aposiopetic properties becomes an instance of the “schizophrenic” 
aesthetic, regardless of whether the text itself, and the context and 
intentions of its author, would support such an interpretation. Jameson’s 
ontologically objective approach to the contemporary artwork regards 
even the U.S. Marxist aesthetic of the new sentence as an expression of 
the late-capitalist totality, rather than as a meaningful expression of the 
poet’s resistant response to this mode of social organization. Admittedly, 
Marxist theory is often skeptical about the capacity of subjectivity per se to 
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resist capitalism: the subject’s identification with false, repressive needs, 
means that inner life is a perjured witness to the crimes of capitalism 
against human potential. But Jameson’s Lacan-inspired repudiation of 
consciousness closes the Marxist universe of discourse, eliminating in 
theory what has not yet been eliminated in practice—namely, the sub-
ject’s alienation and unhappiness in the world of consumer capitalism. 
That this apathetic fallacy should seem so necessary a component of 
rigorous critical inquiry surely indicates the success of what Marcuse in 
One-Dimensional Man calls a “radical empiricist onslaught” that “provides 
the methodological justification for the debunking of the mind by the 
intellectuals.”26 
IV
i hope to have created greater uncertainty about what may be taken 
for granted in literary criticism. Where does literary criticism pretend, 
for the sake of disciplinary convenience, that mental phenomena are 
irrelevant to critical inquiry, and perhaps even unreal? Although i have 
concentrated largely in this article on intention and meaning, there 
are other discipline-founding injunctions that exclude subjective phe-
nomena from critical inquiry. Again, Wimsatt and Beardsley provide 
a useful illustration. Their argument against “The Affective Fallacy” 
assumes the irrelevance of subjective phenomena to reader-response: 
“The reports of some readers […] that a poem or story induces in them 
vivid images, intense feelings, or heightened consciousness, is neither 
anything which can be refuted nor anything which it is possible for the 
objective critic to take into account.”27 Wimsatt and Beardsley may yet 
be vindicated. But their argument against the relevance of affective 
reports relies upon the assumption found in “The intentional Fal-
lacy” that such reports are inevitably both incorrigible and capricious, 
and that reference to subjective response would therefore replace the 
author’s oracular authority with that of the reader. Their conclusion 
is certainly not shared by Jane Tompkins in her monograph, West of 
Everything: the Inner Life of Westerns. it is really the inner lives of readers 
of Westerns that interests Tompkins: “you go to a Western for […] the 
feeling that adventure stimulates […] First the narrow rivulet of fear 
running inside you that widens or narrows depending on how close the 
danger is. Then moments of excited dread—dry throat, tingling palms, 
accelerated heartbeat—the high. Then moments of relief, the body 
at ease, comforted, letting go.”28 Tompkins’s recuperation of affective 
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response is not isolated: her work bears a family resemblance to Robert 
c. Solomon’s defense of sentimental literary response,29 and also to my 
own attack on what he perceives as a “taboo on tenderness” in literary 
theory.30 The work of Tompkins, Solomon, and myself can be seen as 
a prolonged attack on the apathetic fallacy within the realm of reader 
response—just as Knapp and Michaels can be regarded as exposing and 
attacking the apathetic fallacy in literary semantics, and just as i may be 
regarded as criticizing the apathetic fallacy in Jameson’s Lacan-inspired 
literary theory (and also in Lacanian theory, per se). 
i offer the concept of the “apathetic fallacy” as a way of classifying 
and characterizing one of the central errors of contemporary critical 
inquiry: namely, an insistence on an objective, “outer” ontology for the 
objects of literary criticism, and a corresponding repudiation of the 
“inner life” of all our literary practices. A disciplinary audit is, i think, 
needed in order to discover just where we may have fallen into an 
habitual and unwarranted neglect of subjective phenomena. Without 
such a re-examination of what we take for granted, then literary criti-
cism, by insisting on the irrelevance and even the unreality of mental 
phenomena, will continue to commit the apathetic fallacy. 
Manchester Metropolitan University
1. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, abridgement by D. c. Somervell (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), p. 60.
2. R. D. Laing, The Voice of Experience (New york: Pantheon, 1982), p. 85.
3. John Searle, The Rediscovery of Mind (cambridge: MiT Press, 1992), p. 16; hereafter 
abbreviated RM.
4. Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Theory,” Critical Inquiry 8 (Sum-
mer 1982): 723–42; hereafter abbreviated “AT.” Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, 
“Against Theory 2: hermeneutics and Deconstruction,” Critical Inquiry 14 (1987): 49–68; 
hereafter abbreviated “AT2.”
5. i follow the occasional usage of Knapp and Michaels, who adopt the term from Paul 
Ricoeur (“AT2,” pp. 53–54).
6. P. D. Juhl, Interpretation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 107–8; hereafter abbreviated I.
7. W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe c. Beardsley, “The intentional Fallacy,” in The Verbal 
63Gavin Miller
Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (London: Methuen, 1970), p. 10; hereafter abbrevi-
ated “iF.”
8. charles P. Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), p. 62; hereafter abbreviated SC.
9. Noël carroll, Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (cambridge: cambridge University 
Press, 2001), p. 159; hereafter abbreviated BA.
10. Richard Rorty, “incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” Journal of Philosophy 67 
(1970): 399–424.
11. Paisley Livingston, “intention in Art,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold 
Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 282.
12. W. R. D. Fairbairn, “Dissociation and Repression,” in From Instinct to Self: Selected Papers 
of W. R. D. Fairbairn: Volume II: Applications and Early Contributions, ed. ellinor Fairbairn 
Birtles and David e. Scharff (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1994), p. 25.
13. Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III 1955–1956, trans. 
Russell Grigg (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 7; hereafter abbreviated P.
14. Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, trans. J. hoenig and Marian W. hamilton 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963); hereafter abbreviated GP.
15. See, for instance, Theodore Abel, “The Operation called Verstehen,” in Readings in the 
Philosophy of Science, ed. herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New york: Appleton-century-
crofts, 1953), pp. 677–87; edgar Zilsel, “Physics and the Problem of historico-Sociological 
Laws,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New 
york: Appleton-century-crofts, 1953), pp. 714–22.
16. Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique 
(cambridge: harvard University Press, 1997), p. 158; hereafter abbreviated LP.
17. Jeff Zeleny, “Political Memo—Feeling a challenge, Obama Sharpens his Silver 
Tongue,” New York Times, 9 Sept. 2008.
18. elisabeth Bumller and Michael cooper, “Palin Assails critics and electrifies Party,” 
New York Times, 4 Sept. 2008.
19. François Roustang, The Lacanian Delusion, trans. Greg Sims (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1990), p. 112; hereafter abbreviated LD.
20. Michael Billig, “Lacan’s Misuse of Psychology: evidence, Rhetoric and the Mirror 
Stage,” Theory, Culture & Society 23 (2006): 1–26; Raymond Tallis, Not Saussure: A Critique 
of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory (houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
21. See, for instance, Brian D. Mackenzie, Behaviourism and the Limits of Scientific Method 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 13.
22. R. D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (harmonds-
worth: Pelican, 1965).
23. Thomas G. Pavel, The Feud of Language: A History of Structuralist Thought (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 97.
64 Philosophy and Literature
24. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), p. 26; hereafter abbreviated P.
25. George hartley, Textual Politics and the Language Poets (Bloomington: indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1989); Bob Perelman, “Parataxis and Narrative: The New Sentence in Theory 
and Practice,” American Literature 65 (1993): 313–24; hereafter abbreviated “PN.”
26. herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 13.
27. W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe c. Beardsley, “The Affective Fallacy,” in The Verbal Icon: 
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (London: Methuen, 1970), p. 32.
28. Jane Tompkins, West of Everything: The Inner Life of Westerns (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1992), p. 210.
29. Robert c. Solomon, In Defense of Sentimentality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004).
30. Gavin Miller, “A Wall of ideas: The ‘Taboo on Tenderness’ in Theory and culture,” 
New Literary History 38 (2007): 667–81.
